Opening Statement of U.S. Sen. Chuck Grassley of Iowa
Chairman, Senate Committee on Finance
Hearing on Social Security: Achieving Sustainable Solvency
Wednesday, May 25, 2005
Today’s hearing is the third in a series of hearings on Social Security.
The first hearing focused on the long-term outlook for Social Security. The secondfocused on plans to achieve sustainable solvency, with and without individual accounts. Today’shearing will focus on a menu of options to achieve sustainable solvency, and address thepotential payroll “tax gap.”
The menu of options was developed by the Congressional Budget Office. However, Irequested CBO to score each item on the menu to reflect the economic and demographicassumptions in the latest Social Security Trustees report.
I made this request for two reasons. First, the Social Security Trustees are required by lawto report each year on the actuarial status of Social Security. I do not believe we want to adopt areform plan based on more optimistic CBO assumptions only to have the Trustees tell us in theirnext report that we did not accomplish our intended goal.
Second, when it comes to Social Security, I believe we should always err on the side ofcaution. Using overly optimistic assumptions is exactly what brings us here today.Social Security was enacted in 1935 and began paying monthly benefits in 1940. Over thenext three and a half decades, Congress expanded coverage and increased benefits on an ad hocbasis.
By the late 1960s, there was growing interest in adopting automatic cost-of-livingadjustments. But, there was a significant impediment to doing so. Since 1935, the actuaries whoprepared long-range cost estimates for Social Security had utilized an actuarial technique knownas the “level earnings assumption.”
Basically, the actuaries assumed wages would remain fixed at their current level foreverinto the future. In 1935, that was not an unreasonable assumption. Indeed, wages in 1935 werestill below the level that had prevailed in 1920.
The actuaries believed this assumption imposed a measure of fiscal discipline andprovided a cushion against unanticipated events. Congress was willing to go along because, astime passed and wages grew, it was able to periodically dispense the “windfall” in the form ofhigher benefits.
Despite the availability of such windfalls, critics began to suggest a new approach wasneeded. They pointed out that rising inflation imposed an undue burden on Social Securitybeneficiaries who were forced to wait on Congress to enact a benefit increase. The proposedsolution was an automatic cost of living adjustment.
The idea of indexing benefits to prices, or even wages, had been contemplated for severalyears. But, the implementation of an automatic benefit increase was incompatible with the levelearnings assumption. Any long-range projection based on rising benefits and level wages wouldshow large and growing deficits.
So, critics began a campaign to discredit the level earnings assumption and adopt“dynamic assumptions.” This campaign led to the 1969-71 Advisory Council recommendationthat Social Security projections be based on the assumption that earnings would rise in the future.
By adopting dynamic assumptions, Social Security suddenly appeared to have asignificant surplus. But, unlike the windfall that resulted from an actual wage increase, thesurplus under dynamic assumptions was merely assumed.
Nevertheless, several members of Congress seized on the Advisory Council’srecommendation and urged an immediate 20 percent across-the-board increase, accompanied byautomatic benefit increases thereafter.
Bypassing the normal committee process, an indexing amendment was offered on theSenate floor to a “must pass” bill increasing the statutory debt limit. It passed overwhelmingly inJune of 1972.
The congressional debate that preceded passage of the indexing amendment focused onkeeping benefits up with inflation. For those who were already collecting benefits, theamendment delivered as promised. But, for those who were not yet receiving benefits, theamendment had an entirely different effect. Depending on the relative change in wages andprices, initial benefits for newly eligible recipients would rise faster than prices or even wages.
This critical distinction between initial benefits and subsequent benefits might have goneunnoticed for years, but economic and demographic forces soon intervened to reveal the formulawas flawed and the goal of wage-indexing was no longer affordable at the scheduled payroll taxrate.
The 1972 amendment was based on two assumptions: that wages would rise nearly twiceas fast as inflation, and the number of births would remain near the baby-boom level. Underthese two conditions, initial benefits would rise in line with wages, and there would be plenty ofworkers to support each beneficiary, without raising the payroll tax beyond 12.5 percent.
However, the decade of the 70’s saw rising inflation and the end of the baby boom. Theflawed formula caused benefits to rise faster than wages and the declining birth rate resulted in aprojected decline in the ratio of workers to beneficiaries. As a result, the Social Security Trusteesbegan to report ever-rising deficits.
In response to these Trustees’ reports, the Senate Finance Committee and the HouseWays and Means Committee requested the appointment of an independent consultant panel toexamine the problem and develop alternatives.
The panel issued its report in 1976 and recommended that Congress index initial benefitsto prices, instead of wages. But, advocates for higher benefits sought to replace the flawed ’72formula with another wage-indexing formula that was less erratic and unpredictable.
Ironically, the flaw of the ‘72 formula became its biggest asset. Between 1972 and 1977,the projected cost more than doubled from 12 percent to 24 percent of taxable wages. Advocatesof wage-indexing sought to portray their version of wage-indexing as a significant savingsbecause it cost “only” 18 percent of taxable wages.
Advocates of wage-indexing persuaded Congress to adopt their plan in 1977 bysimultaneously arguing that it was cheaper than current law and more generous than priceindexing.The fact that changing demographics had rendered the promised level of wage-indexedbenefits unaffordable at the scheduled payroll tax rate did not seem to matter. Advocatesdismissed the projections of future deficits by suggesting economic and demographic changesmight solve the problem. If not, Congress would have plenty of time to think of something.Well, here we are today still tying to think of something. Members of this Committee willno doubt find the menu of options presented by our witnesses today less than appetizing. Theyare welcome to put their own options on the table, and we will consider them. But, the time hasas come to address this issue.
Let me conclude by sharing with you the admonition given to this Committee by theconsultant panel in 1976: “This Panel gravely doubts the fairness and wisdom of now promisingbenefits at such a level that we must commit our sons and daughters to a higher tax rate than weourselves are willing to pay.”