Grassley Seeks More Information on Foreign Threats to U.S. Research Institutions

WASHINGTON
– U.S. Sen. Chuck Grassley of Iowa, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee
and senior member and former chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, today
wrote to the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) Inspector General (IG) requesting information about the threats
posed by foreign actors seeking to steal U.S. intellectual property by
exploiting U.S. research institutions and the vetting processes in place
regarding researchers and public grants and the steps the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the DOJ and the HHS IG take to ensure the integrity of
taxpayer-funded research.

“The
threats to our academic institutions from foreign governments are well known.
Our government must take all reasonable and necessary steps to protect the
integrity of taxpayer-funded research. Those steps must include constant and
efficient communication between NIH, the Justice Department, and other relevant
agencies.” Grassley wrote. “Congress also requires a clear understanding of
what enforcement actions have been employed against such foreign agents and
U.S. institutions where any conduct has occurred in violation of law or regulation.”

Specifically,
Grassley is requesting information from DOJ regarding the FBI background check
process for researchers, the steps federal law enforcement has taken to educate
various government agencies and institutions of higher learning about the threat
and a history of investigatory and prosecutorial steps taken by the department
in the last five years. Grassley is requesting information from the HHS IG
regarding its role in ensuring the integrity of research and its investigative
history with respect to foreign threats to research within the last five years.

In
October 2018, Grassley initially wrote
to National Institutes of Health (NIH) seeking information on this topic.
Grassley held
a hearing in December 2018 regarding Chinese threats to national security
where he highlighted the foreign threat to taxpayer-funded research. In that
hearing, the FBI witness stated that China’s talent recruitment programs
are effectively “brain gain programs” that “encourage theft of intellectual
property from U.S. institutions.”

In
January 2019, Grassley received
a response from NIH, but it left many questions unanswered, including how
much taxpayer money is dedicated to oversight functions within NIH and critical
reporting mechanisms that would root out and stop waste, fraud and abuse and
protect the integrity of taxpayer-funded research.

Grassley’s
letter to DOJ can be found
here and below and letter to the HHS IG can be found
here and below.

January
17, 2019

 

Matthew
Whitaker

Acting
Attorney General

Department
of Justice

 

The
Honorable Christopher Wray

Director

Federal
Bureau of Investigation

Dear
Acting Attorney General Whitaker and Director Wray,

 

           
On October 23, 2018, I wrote to the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
regarding foreign threats to the integrity of taxpayer funded research. 
My letter noted an August 20, 2018, letter to NIH grantee institutions from Dr.
Francis S. Collins, the director of NIH, which called attention to a series of
threats posed by foreign entities to the integrity of U.S. biomedical
research.  Dr. Collins warned that foreign actors have “mounted systematic
programs to influence NIH researchers and peer reviewers” in an effort to
divert intellectual property produced by NIH-supported research to other
countries, and may have contributed resources to NIH-funded researchers in ways
which could impact the integrity of the research.[1]

           
On December 12, 2018, I held a hearing on Chinese threats to national security.[2]  In that hearing, Justice
Department and FBI officials made clear that the threat to our research is
real.  For example, the Justice Department witness, Mr. John Demers,
stated, “we need to adapt our enforcement strategy to reach non-traditional
collectors, including researchers in labs, universities, and the defense
industrial base, some of whom may have undisclosed ties to Chinese institutions
and conflicted loyalties.”[3] 
The FBI witness, Mr. Bill Priestap, stated that China’s talent recruitment
programs are effectively “brain gain programs” that “encourage theft of
intellectual property from U.S. institutions.”[4] 
Prior to that hearing, in February 2018, Director Wray testified before the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence about worldwide threats.  Wray
testified, in part, that the Chinese are “exploiting” and “taking advantage” of
our academic institutions.[5] 

The threats to our academic institutions
from foreign governments are well known.  Our government must take all
reasonable and necessary steps to protect the integrity of taxpayer-funded
research.  Those steps must include constant and efficient communication
between NIH, the Justice Department, and other relevant agencies.

In response to my letter, NIH noted the
important role additional agencies, including the Justice Department, play in
safeguarding taxpayer-funded research and intellectual property. 
Specifically, NIH stated that it “closely works with and fully cooperates with
its federal partners, including but not limited to the HHS OIG and the Department
of Justice, during their reviews and investigations.”[6] 
However, the letter also noted that the federal government does not vet these
individuals who will work on federally funded research ex ante, but relies on
the colleges and universities where they will be working to do so.  That
approach raises questions as to whether the federal government is taking the
necessary steps to proactively identify and mitigate threats to research. 
Congress needs to fully understand how and to what extent the Justice
Department and FBI assist in identifying potential foreign agents and their
threat to research and intellectual property developed in the United States
with taxpayer funds.   Congress also requires a clear understanding
of what enforcement actions have been employed against such foreign agents and
U.S. institutions where any conduct has occurred in violation of law or
regulation.  Accordingly, please answer the following no later than
January 31, 2019.

1.    
Please
describe in detail the process by which the DOJ and FBI conducts or assists
with background checks of researchers and U.S. institutions that have received
or will receive federal funds.

2.    
Please
describe the steps the DOJ and FBI have taken to educate and inform relevant
agencies, universities, colleges, and other entities about the foreign threat
to the integrity of medical research. 

3.    
In
the past five years, how many investigations and prosecutions has DOJ and FBI
conducted of researchers who participated in federally funded research and
allegedly failed to disclose their receipt of foreign government funding?

4.    
In
the past five years, how many investigations and prosecutions has DOJ and FBI
conducted of researchers who were allegedly agents of a foreign government?

5.    
In
the past five years, how many investigations and prosecutions has DOJ and FBI
conducted of researchers who allegedly stole intellectual property created by
taxpayer-funded research? 

In addition to providing answers, please
provide a briefing to my staff no later than February 7, 2019.

I anticipate that your written reply and
most responsive documents will be unclassified. Please send all unclassified
material directly to the Committee. In keeping with the requirements of
Executive Order 13526, if any of the responsive documents do contain classified
information, please segregate all unclassified material within the classified
documents, provide all unclassified information directly to the Committee, and
provide a classified addendum to the Office of Senate Security. Although the
Committee complies with all laws and regulations governing the handling of
classified information, it is not bound, absent its prior agreement, by any
handling restrictions. 

Thank you in advance for your prompt
attention to these matters. Should you have any questions, please contact Josh
Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at (202) 224-4515.

Sincerely,

 

Charles E. Grassley   
                       

Chairman                               

                                               
                      
Committee on Finance

 

January
17, 2019

The
Honorable Daniel R. Levinson

Inspector
General

U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services

 

Dear
Inspector General Levinson,

           
On October 23, 2018, I wrote to the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
regarding foreign threats to the integrity of taxpayer funded research. 
My letter noted an August 20, 2018, letter to NIH grantee institutions from Dr.
Francis S. Collins, the director of NIH, which called attention to a series of
threats posed by foreign entities to the integrity of U.S. biomedical
research.  Dr. Collins warned that foreign actors have “mounted systematic
programs to influence NIH researchers and peer reviewers” in an effort to
divert intellectual property produced by NIH-supported research to other
countries, and may have contributed resources to NIH-funded researchers in ways
which could impact the integrity of the research.[7]

           
On December 12, 2018, I held a hearing on Chinese threats to national security.[8]  In that hearing, Justice
Department and FBI officials made clear that the threat to our research is
real.  For example, the Justice Department witness, Mr. John Demers,
stated, “we need to adapt our enforcement strategy to reach non-traditional
collectors, including researchers in labs, universities, and the defense
industrial base, some of whom may have undisclosed ties to Chinese institutions
and conflicted loyalties.”[9] 
The FBI witness, Mr. Bill Priestap, stated that China’s talent recruitment
programs are effectively “brain gain programs” that “encourage theft of
intellectual property from U.S. institutions.”[10] 
Prior to that hearing, in February 2018, Director Wray testified before the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence about worldwide threats.  Wray
testified, in part, that the Chinese are “exploiting” and “taking advantage” of
our academic institutions.[11]

The threats to our academic institutions
from foreign governments are well known.   Our government must take
all reasonable and necessary steps to protect the integrity of taxpayer-funded
research.  Those steps must include constant and efficient communication
between NIH, the Health and Human Services Inspector General, and other
relevant agencies

In response to my letter, NIH noted the
important role additional agencies, including the Justice Department, play in
safeguarding taxpayer funded research and intellectual property. 
Specifically, NIH stated that it “closely works with and fully cooperates with
its federal partners, including but not limited to the HHS OIG and the
Department of Justice, during their reviews and investigations.”[12]   NIH’s response also
noted that if institutions “fail to take corrective actions” they may be
subject to administrative sanctions “which can include a referral to HHS OIG
for further consideration.”[13] 
However, the letter also noted that the federal government does not vet these
individuals who will work on federally funded research ex ante, but relies on
the colleges and universities where they will be working to do so.  That
approach raises questions as to whether the federal government is taking the
necessary steps to proactively identify and mitigate threats to research. 
Congress needs to fully understand how and to what extent the HHS OIG assists
in identifying potential foreign agents and their threat to research and
intellectual property developed in the United States with taxpayer
funds.   Congress also requires a clear understanding of what
enforcement actions have been employed against such foreign agents and U.S.
institutions where any conduct has occurred in violation of law or
regulation.  Accordingly, please answer the following no later than
January 31, 2019:

 

6.    
Please
describe in detail the process by which the Health and Human Services Inspector
General interfaces with NIH, the Justice Department and other relevant agencies
to protect the integrity of medical research from foreign threats.

7.    
In
the past five years, how many institutions have been referred by NIH to HHS OIG
for noncompliance issues related to medical research?  In your response,
please include data on referrals for the institution’s failure to take
corrective action after learning researchers received contributions from
foreign governments and did not disclose it, and referrals for institutions
that failed to adequately perform background checks on researchers involved in
taxpayer-funded research.  For each referral, please provide the reason for
which the referral was made, the institution in question, and the resulting
action taken by HHS OIG. 

8.    
In
the past five years, how many investigations has HHS OIG conducted of
researchers who participated in federally funded research and allegedly failed
to disclose their receipt of foreign government funding?

9.    
In
the past five years, how many investigations has HHS OIG conducted of
researchers who were allegedly agents of a foreign government?

10. 
In
the past five years, how many investigations has HHS OIG conducted of
researchers who allegedly stole intellectual property created by
taxpayer-funded research? 

11. 
In
the past five years, how many referrals has the HHS OIG made to the Justice
Department for potential prosecution relating to researchers who participated in
federally funded research and allegedly failed to disclose their receipt of
foreign government funding; researchers who were allegedly agents of a foreign
government; and researchers who allegedly stole intellectual property created
by taxpayer-funded research?  How many referrals were accepted for
prosecution and what was the result of each?

In addition to providing answers, please
provide a briefing to my staff no later than February 7, 2019.

I anticipate that your written reply and
most responsive documents will be unclassified. Please send all unclassified
material directly to the Committee. In keeping with the requirements of
Executive Order 13526, if any of the responsive documents do contain classified
information, please segregate all unclassified material within the classified
documents, provide all unclassified information directly to the Committee, and
provide a classified addendum to the Office of Senate Security. Although the
Committee complies with all laws and regulations governing the handling of
classified information, it is not bound, absent its prior agreement, by any
handling restrictions. 

Thank you in advance for your prompt
attention to these matters. Should you have any questions, please contact Josh
Flynn-Brown of my Committee staff at (202) 224-4515.

 

Sincerely,

 

Charles E. Grassley   
                       

Chairman                               

                                               
                      
Committee on Finance