

**United States Senate Committee on Finance
June 25, 2026**

Hearing to Consider the Nominations of Brett Doyle, of Connecticut, to be a Member of the United States International Trade Commission for a term expiring December 16, 2030, vice Rhonda K. Schmidlein, term expired;

David Foley, Jr., of Virginia, to be a Member of the United States International Trade Commission for a term expiring June 16, 2032, vice Amy Karpel, term expired; Samuel Negatu, of the District of Columbia, to be a Member of the United States International Trade Commission for a term expiring June 16, 2029, vice F. Scott Kieff, term expired; Peter-Anthony Pappas, of New Jersey, to be a Member of the United States International Trade Commission for the term expiring June 16, 2035, vice Randolph J. Stayin, term expired; and Bartholomew Thanhauser, of New York, to be a Member of the United States International Trade Commission for a term expiring December 16, 2027, vice David S. Johanson, term expired.

Questions for the Record submitted to Brett Doyle from Senator Cassidy.

Question 1: The Commission's Section 332 authority makes it Congress's primary independent source for documenting and quantifying foreign trade barriers, including non-tariff, regulatory, and competition measures. U.S.-headquartered digital commerce and platform companies increasingly report that certain trading partners, including treaty partners bound by national-treatment commitments under existing free trade agreements, apply regulatory, antitrust, and data-governance measures in ways that disadvantage U.S.-affiliated firms relative to domestic incumbents.

(a) If requested by a member of Senate Finance under section 332(g), would you commit to undertaking a thorough, independent investigation quantifying the commercial effects of such measures on U.S. firms, including in the Republic of Korea?

Answer: Yes. If confirmed, I commit to prioritizing fact-finding requests from members of the Committee.

(b) How would you ensure the Commission maintains the economic and sectoral expertise necessary to analyze platform-specific regulation, data-localization mandates, and discriminatory enforcement as trade barriers?

Answer: If confirmed, I will prioritize maintaining experienced and technically proficient staff with analytical expertise in a variety of sectoral disciplines.

(c) What role can the Commission appropriately play in supporting Congressional oversight of whether U.S. FTA partners are honoring their national-treatment and market-access obligations?

Answer: I agree that this is a legitimate subject of inquiry under 19 USC 1332. If confirmed and requested to do so, I will make it a priority to provide the Committee with timely and accurate information regarding this as well as other foreign trade trends.

Question 2: In light of concerns regarding the strategic use of U.S. trade remedy proceedings by foreign actors, including entities affiliated with the People's Republic of China, to impose costs on or otherwise disadvantage domestic producers, please describe your assessment of the risk that such proceedings could be used to target U.S. companies with significant domestic manufacturing investments. What statutory, procedural, or institutional safeguards does the ITC currently employ to ensure that its processes are not misused in this manner?

Answer: It is my understanding that multiple foreign adversaries closely monitor the Commission's proceedings and attempt to achieve outcomes they find favorable. If confirmed, I commit to working with the Committee to ensure Commission proceedings fully reflect Congressional intent with respect to our trade remedy laws.

Question 3: Several foreign producers participating in U.S. trade remedy proceedings have been designated by the U.S. Department of War as "Chinese Military Companies" pursuant to Section 1260H of the FY21 NDAA. In your view, should such designations be disclosed to and considered by the ITC when evaluating the standing, credibility, or interests of foreign entities participating in its proceedings? Please explain how, if at all, such information should factor into the Commission's analysis.

Answer: If confirmed, I commit to following the law and working closely with the Committee to ensure that Commission proceedings fully reflect Congressional intent.

Question 4: The Department of Commerce has, in multiple proceedings, identified circumvention of antidumping and countervailing duty orders through the routing of production via third countries, often involving affiliated entities. How should the ITC account for such circumvention when evaluating injury or the likely effects of subject imports? What authorities or analytical tools does the Commission have to preserve the integrity of its original injury determinations in these circumstances, and do you believe those authorities are sufficient?

Answer: I agree that illegal transshipment and intentional circumvention of legitimate AD/CVD orders are significant problems that require greater attention by the Commission. If confirmed and requested to do so by the Committee, I commit to providing technical assistance on ensuring the efficacy of our trade remedy laws.

Questions for the Record submitted to Brett Doyle from Senator Blackburn.

Question 1: How can the ITC ensure injury determinations reflect the full picture if a petitioner is offshoring production through affiliate entities, and how do we make sure these trade remedy tools protect American jobs rather than just reshuffle competitive advantage outside of the United States?

Answer: Under the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 USC 1677(4)(B)), the Commission has statutory authority to exclude certain entities from "domestic industry" calculations if that firm is

related to exporters and/or importers of dumped goods, or if they themselves import the subject merchandise. If confirmed, I commit to working with the Committee to ensure Commission proceedings reflect Congressional intent with respect to our trade remedy laws.

Questions for the Record submitted to Brett Doyle from Senator Marshall.

Question 1: Phosphate is a critical input for corn and other crop production, and growers have faced sustained high fertilizer costs over the past several years. The Commission is currently conducting a five-year review of the countervailing duty order on phosphate fertilizers from Morocco and Russia, and agricultural groups have raised concerns that the order has constrained import competition at a time when domestic supply has not kept pace with demand. Recognizing these challenges, President Trump temporarily suspended the collection of duties on phosphate fertilizer from Morocco. As you weigh the evidence in this review and in similar matters, how do you intend to ensure the Commission's decision-making process gives full weight to the impacts of its conclusions on American farmers?

Answer: I understand the importance of input costs, like fertilizer, for American farmers. If confirmed, I will follow the law and ensure that all appropriate factors are considered when conducting AD/CVD five-year reviews.

Question 2: American patients often pay significantly more for the same prescription drugs than patients in other developed countries. The Trump administration has begun treating it as a trade matter, including through a recent Section 301 investigation into foreign drug pricing practices. From your perspective, how do foreign pricing practices factor into that gap, and how might the Commission's trade-focused analytical tools, including its Section 332 fact-finding authority, help give Congress a clearer picture of it?

Answer: My understanding is that the Commission does not have a role in Section 301 investigations. That said, if confirmed, I will commit to prioritizing fact-finding requests by members of the Committee, including those that impact the pharmaceutical industry.

Questions for the Record submitted to Brett Doyle from Senator Warren.

1. The ITC plays a key part in determining whether antidumping and countervailing duty relief is granted against a particular product from a foreign country (or countries). In our system, the Commissioners determine whether the domestic industry is materially injured or threatened with material injury by unfairly-traded imports. Do you believe that consumer interest or other policy considerations should be part of that injury determination? If so, how?

Answer: If confirmed I will follow the law and evaluate all statutory criteria for material injury determinations as required by 19 USC 1677(7).

- a. Can you please share your view of if and how forced labor and low-wage labor caused by union busting and other labor rights violations should be incorporated in antidumping and/or countervailing duty investigation with respect to a particular product?

Answer: Slavery is morally abhorrent and the importation of goods produced by forced labor is illegal under 19 USC 1307.

- b. Can you please share your view of if and how the externalization of environmental costs – including air and water emissions, toxic dumping and carbon-intensive production processes –should be incorporated in antidumping and/or countervailing duty investigation with respect to a particular product?

Answer: In the context of AD/CVD investigations, the Department of Commerce is responsible for assessing whether or not dumping or illicit subsidization has occurred.

- c. How should a Commissioner incorporate the concerns of users or consumers of a particular product in an antidumping and/or countervailing duty investigation?

Answer: If confirmed, I will follow the law and evaluate all statutory criteria for material injury determinations under 19 USC 1677(7).

- 2. As you know, U.S. law gives unions and management equal right to petition for relief from unfairly traded imports. These provisions of our law have become increasingly important as multinational companies face threats of retaliation from foreign adversaries and are thus hesitant to publicly support trade cases even when they are being injured by imports.

- a. Do you support the right of unions to file antidumping and countervailing duty petitions even if management does not publicly support them?

Answer: Yes. “Certified unions” are explicitly included in the statutory definition of “interested part[ies]” (19 USC 1671a(b)(1)/1677(9) that are allowed to seek relief under our trade remedy laws.

- b. How would the fact that a case was filed by unions alone affect your injury analysis, if at all?

Answer: This would not, in and of itself, impact the statutory criteria regarding the Commission’s investigation of whether or not material injury exists in an AD/CVD investigation.

- 3. Domestic industries and workers have been forced to play a game of whack-a-mole to bring cases after case against the same product as companies move production from country to country after orders are imposed. China has been a particular problem, as Chinese companies invest in production in third countries to continue accessing the U.S. market to avoid duties, sometimes with Chinese state support. The bipartisan Leveling the Playing Field Act 2.0 would address these problems, including by streamlining successive injury investigations on the same product from different countries at the ITC.

- a. Do you support Leveling the Playing Field Act 2.0?

Answer: It is inappropriate for me, as a nominee, to comment on prospective legislation. That said, if confirmed and requested to do so by the Committee, I commit to providing technical assistance to ensure the efficacy of our trade remedy laws.

- b. As a Commissioner, what would you do to reduce the burden on companies and workers that are injured by repeated surges of dumped and subsidized imports?

Answer: I agree that illegal transshipment and intentional circumvention of legitimate AD/CVD orders are significant problems that require greater attention. If confirmed, I

commit to working with the Committee to ensure Commission proceedings reflect Congressional intent with respect to our trade remedy laws.

- c. Do you believe that it is unfair for other countries, such as China, to grant subsidies to their industries that lower their cost of production versus those of American companies producing the same products here? Do you agree that your job as a Commissioner, if confirmed, is to do all you can to protect the domestic industries against the harm caused by foreign subsidization?

Answer: Yes, in a manner consistent with the law.

- 4. In some cases, importers flood the U.S. market with imports after antidumping and countervailing duty cases are filed but before preliminary Commerce determinations are issued, in order to avoid duty liability. In such cases, the Commerce Department routinely determines that such post-petition surges create critical circumstances, warranting the imposition of retroactive duties to ensure effective relief. The Commission, however, very rarely upholds these determinations, effectively letting importers off the hook for these harmful surges.
 - a. As an ITC Commissioner, how would you evaluate critical circumstances determinations?

Answer: If confirmed, I commit to considering all statutory critical circumstances factors raised by parties.

- b. Do you see any reason why the ITC should nullify retroactive duties that Commerce has approved?

Answer: My understanding is that fact patterns vary widely between individual cases brought before the Commission. As such, it would not be appropriate to speculate or prejudge whether or not the Commission should nullify any specific retroactive duties that the Department of Commerce has approved.

- 5. In some injury investigations and sunset reviews, foreign producers do not fully cooperate with the ITC's injury investigations, resulting in an incomplete record that understates foreign production and capacity, and thus the threat that foreign producers pose. The ITC has the authority to impose adverse inferences in such cases of non-cooperation, thus supporting an affirmative determination despite the lack of a complete record. Yet the ITC rarely or ever exercises this power.
 - a. As an ITC Commissioner, will you support the application of adverse inferences if foreign producers do not cooperate with your investigations or reviews?

Answer: Yes, in a manner consistent with the law.

- 6. In addition to its injury investigations, the ITC plays an important role in conducting economic analyses of trade and tariff actions. In the past, the ITC has used economic models that have minimized the harmful impact of free trade agreements on production and jobs. The Commission has also been responsible for analyzing the impact of tariff actions under Section 232 and Section 301.
 - a. As an ITC Commissioner, what would you do to make sure that these economic impact studies appropriately take into account the positive role that tariffs can

have as part of an industrial policy that supports American industries, workers, and communities?

Answer: I understand that concerns have been raised that certain economic models used by the Commission are materially deficient and fail to give lawmakers an accurate understanding of the tradeoffs associated with changes in U.S. trade policy. If confirmed, I commit to working with the Committee to ensure that the Commission uses economic methodologies and analyses that maximize Congress's accurate understanding of U.S. trade policy.

7. Please share an example of an antidumping or countervailing duty order that, in your view, has effectively addressed unfair trade and helped to maintain the operations of American businesses?

Answer: All existing AD/CVD orders are subject to continuing sunset review. As such, it would be inappropriate for me to speculate on or prejudge the merits of any particular case without fully reviewing its factual record.

8. Can you describe your experience with trade-affected communities in the United States? What industry did the community rely on? What kinds of government policy intervention would have helped the community?

Answer: I grew up and attended public school in a small farming community in northwestern Connecticut, between the Housatonic and Naugatuck River valleys. Throughout the 19th and mid-20th centuries this area was a powerhouse of American manufacturing, producing clocks, rubber, and wire, and was especially notable for its dominance in brass and small arms production. Over the past 50 years, however, the region's industrial base has declined precipitously and job opportunities are limited, particularly for those not working in seasonal tourism and without a college degree.

The Commission plays a unique and consequential role in our trade and regulatory system. Its determinations affect American industries, workers, and consumers, and its integrity depends on rigorous, impartial analysis grounded in the law. If confirmed, I commit to applying that standard to every matter before me.

9. What is your view of how U.S. trade data gathering and reporting can be improved? When the USITC conducts analysis of trade pact impacts or projections about new pacts, what data set do you believe should be employed – domestic exports or general exports? What is your view about how counting re-exports as if they were domestic exports distorts U.S. trade balance data?

Answer: I understand that concerns have been raised that certain economic models used by the Commission are materially deficient and fail to give lawmakers an accurate understanding of the tradeoffs associated with changes in U.S. trade policy. If confirmed, I commit to working with the Committee to ensure that the Commission uses economic methodologies and analyses that maximize Congress's accurate understanding of U.S. trade policy.

10. If trade agreements contain rules that allow tech companies to plead “illegal trade discrimination” to avoid accountability for monopolistic and discriminatory behavior, not only will personal privacy and consumers’ trust in the Internet be threatened, but the United States’ economic and national security as well. Do you support the new U.S. digital trade position, which has involved eliminating data flow, source code and digital products rules that constrain domestic tech regulatory policy space? More broadly, do you believe that U.S. trade agreements must not include terms that could conflict with U.S. domestic law? How would you evaluate the impact of such provisions, if the ITC was tasked with doing so, and what methodologies would you use?

Answer: The Commission does not negotiate free trade agreements or set trade policy, as such, it is not appropriate for me to comment on the merits of potential negotiation outcomes. If confirmed, I commit to working with the Committee to ensure that the Commission uses economic methodologies and analyses that maximize Congress’s accurate understanding of U.S. trade policy.

11. ITC Commissioners play a central role in ensuring that U.S. antidumping and countervailing laws are fully and effectively administered. Commissioners are tasked with sifting through what are often voluminous records to ensure that all evidence is carefully considered and weighed and, where necessary, discounted if inaccurate, flawed, or otherwise deficient. This includes questionnaire data that may be distorted. It is my understanding that it is not uncommon for U.S. importers in these trade remedy cases to manipulate their data in order to mask underselling and other adverse price effects. How would you view your role as a Commissioner when presented with cases where U.S. importers are playing games with their data to mask underselling, for example? In those instances, would you look to other evidence on the record in determining whether unfairly traded U.S. imports are having adverse price effects on the domestic industry? Do you agree that the record should be considered holistically in evaluating adverse price effects?

Answer: If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the data for any particular investigation is as complete and accurate as possible.

12. Historically, the USITC analysis relies on wholly unrealistic models and assumptions regarding the U.S. labor market and that systematically ignore the negative effects of trade agreements on workers, particularly workers of color, and on the overall health of the American economy.
- Do you agree that the Commission should adopt a model that does not assume full employment or costless job switching for workers?
 - Do you agree that the Commission should adopt a model that analyzes how trade agreements have affected the quality of jobs available for workers, including any shifts in wages, benefits, or job security?
 - Do you agree that the Commission should adopt a model that analyzes how trade agreements have affected workers by region or community?

- d. Do you agree that the Commission should adopt a model that analyzes how trade agreements have affected workers by racial group?
- e. Do you agree that the Commission should adopt a model that analyzes how trade agreements have affected market concentration in the United States?
- f. Do you agree that the Commission should adopt a model that analyzes how trade agreements have affected the United States' technological capacity and the resilience of critical supply chains?
- g. Do you agree that the Commission should adopt a model that analyzes how the trade agreements have affected important labor, environmental, and consumer safety standards, financial regulations, consumer privacy and other digital governance concerns, and the price of medications subject to intellectual property protections extended under U.S. trade agreements and also the net effect of any such trade agreement provisions?

Answer to 12a through 12g: I understand that concerns have been raised that certain economic models used by the Commission are materially deficient and fail to give lawmakers an accurate understanding of the tradeoffs associated with changes in U.S. trade policy. If confirmed, I commit to working with the Committee to ensure that the Commission uses economic methodologies and analyses that maximize Congress's accurate understanding of U.S. trade policy.

13. Given your employment as a lobbyist for a company or industry group with members that could bring matters before the USITC, I request that you make additional ethics commitments. If confirmed, will you commit not to lobby the USITC — including through unregistered “shadow” or “behind-the-scenes” lobbying — for at least four years after leaving the USITC?

Answer: I will follow all ethics rules and regulations as required by law.

14. Will you commit to not seeking employment or board membership with, or another form of compensation from (including as an expert witness), any company that brought a case before the USITC during your term with the USITC during your tenure, for at least four years after leaving office?

Answer: I will follow all ethics rules and regulations as required by law.

15. Will you commit not to lobby the USITC — including through unregistered “shadow” or “behind-the-scenes” lobbying — for at least four years after leaving office?

Answer: I will follow all ethics rules and regulations as required by law.

16. Will you commit to recuse yourself from any particular matters involving your former clients and employers for at least four years?

Answer: I will follow all ethics rules and regulations as required by law.

17. Will you commit to recuse yourself from any particular matters, including particular matters of general applicability, that directly impact your former clients and employers for at least four years?

Answer: I will follow all ethics rules and regulations as required by law. In the event that an actual or potential conflict of interest arises during my appointment, I will consult with an agency ethics official and take measures necessary to resolve the conflict.

18. Will you commit to setting up a screening process that would involve a third-party staff member screening each of your matters, before you learn of the matter, to determine whether the matter would trigger a conflict of interest?

Answer: I will follow all ethics rules and regulations as required by law. In the event that an actual or potential conflict of interest arises during my appointment, I will consult with an agency ethics official and take measures necessary to resolve the conflict.

19. If you do create a screening process to comply with your recusal requirements, who would be responsible for identifying particular matters from which you should recuse?

Answer: I will follow all ethics rules and regulations as required by law. In the event that an actual or potential conflict of interest arises during my appointment, I will consult with an agency ethics official and take measures necessary to resolve the conflict.

20. What role, if any, do you intend to personally have in identifying particular matters from which you must recuse?

Answer: I will follow all ethics rules and regulations as required by law. In the event that an actual or potential conflict of interest arises during my appointment, I will consult with an agency ethics official and take measures necessary to resolve the conflict.

Questions for the Record submitted to Brett Doyle from Senator Warnock.

Question 1: Georgia businesses and consumers are facing significant [inflationary](#) pressure due to the president's [tariffs](#). To what extent should consumer costs factor into the Commission's analysis when it is investigating injury to domestic industries?

Answer: If confirmed I will follow the law and evaluate all statutory criteria for material injury determinations as required by 19 USC 1677(7).

Question 2: The ITC is required by [statute](#) to act in the [public's interest](#). Tariffs or other trade remedies may protect an industry, but this may increase costs for other downstream businesses, resulting in higher prices for the public. When presented with evidence like this, how will you determine where the public interest lies?

Answer: If confirmed, I commit to considering all statutory criteria as required by 19 USC 1337 for public interest determinations.

Question 3: What evidence would you find most persuasive in determining whether trade remedies will preserve or create U.S. jobs?

Answer: My understanding is that fact patterns vary widely between individual cases brought before the Commission. As such, specific evidence indicating job loss or creation will also vary between cases. If confirmed, I commit to considering the full record when making an injury determination.

Question 4: Certain Chinese entities may be using U.S. trade laws in ways that undermine manufacturing capacity and disadvantage companies that have invested in American production. Are you concerned that Chinese manufacturers could attempt to use U.S. trade proceedings to target American manufacturers that have made substantial investments in U.S. manufacturing?

a. If so, what kind of ITC remedies are available to address this problem?

Answer: It is my understanding that multiple foreign adversaries closely monitor Commission proceedings and attempt to achieve outcomes they find favorable. If confirmed, I commit to working with the Committee to ensure Commission proceedings fully reflect Congressional intent with respect to our trade remedy laws.

Question 5: If evidence suggests that a trade petition is being funded, coordinated, or encouraged by Chinese manufacturers, Chinese investors, or entities affiliated with the Chinese government, should that information be disclosed and considered by the Commission?

Answer: It is my understanding that multiple foreign adversaries closely monitor Commission proceedings and attempt to achieve outcomes they find favorable. If confirmed, I commit to working with the Committee to ensure Commission proceedings fully reflect Congressional intent with respect to our trade remedy laws.

Question 6: Should petitioners be required to disclose whether they receive funding, investment, legal support, supply chain inputs, or other material assistance from Chinese companies or Chinese state-supported entities?

Answer: It is my understanding that multiple foreign adversaries closely monitor Commission proceedings and attempt to achieve outcomes they find favorable. If confirmed, I commit to working with the Committee to ensure Commission proceedings fully reflect Congressional intent with respect to our trade remedy laws.

Question 7: How can the ITC ensure that U.S. trade laws intended to protect American industry are not used to advance the interests of Chinese competitors seeking to undermine domestic manufacturing capacity?

Answer: It is my understanding that multiple foreign adversaries closely monitor Commission proceedings and attempt to achieve outcomes they find favorable. If confirmed, I commit to working with the Committee to ensure Commission proceedings fully reflect Congressional intent with respect to our trade remedy laws.

Question 8: Should Congress consider additional safeguards to prevent Chinese-affiliated entities from using U.S. trade laws in ways that could weaken American supply chains and manufacturing jobs?

Answer: If confirmed and requested to do so by the Committee, I commit to providing technical assistance to ensure the efficacy of our trade remedy laws.

